Manufacturer-remanufacturing vs supplier-remanufacturing in a closed-loop supply chain by Xiong, Yu et al.
Citation: Xiong, Yu, Zhao, Quanwu and Zhou, Yu (2016) Manufacturer-remanufacturing vs 
supplier-remanufacturing in a closed-loop supply chain. International Journal of Production 
Economics, 176. pp. 21-28. ISSN 0925 5273 
Published by: Elsevier
URL:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.03.001 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.03.001>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/26507/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to  third parties in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content must  not  be 
changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been 
made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the 
published version of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be 
required.)
Manufacturer-remanufacturing vs supplier-remanufacturing
in a closed-loop supply chain
Yu Xiong a, Quanwu Zhao b, Yu Zhou b,n
a Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University, Newcastle NE1 8ST, UK
b School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, 174 Shazhengjie, Chongqing 400044, PR China
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 8 December 2014
Accepted 22 February 2016
Available online 8 March 2016
Keywords:
Supply chain management
Remanufacturing
Environmental performance
a b s t r a c t
Remanufacturing at the component level could be performed by either a manufacturer or a supplier. In
this paper, we analyze the performance of manufacturer-remanufacturing and supplier-remanufacturing
in a decentralized closed-loop supply chain, and examine their desirability from different stakeholder
perspectives. We ﬁnd that the manufacturer may engage in remanufacturing of used components even if
remanufacturing is costlier than traditional manufacturing; given remanufacturing is costlier, the man-
ufacturer may forgo remanufacturing due to a marginal increase in consumer willingness-to-pay for the
remanufactured product. If the unit remanufacturing cost is high enough, the manufacturer and con-
sumers prefer manufacturer-remanufacturing, while the supplier and the environment prefer supplier-
remanufacturing; otherwise, the manufacturer, the supplier, and consumers prefer supplier-remanu-
facturing, while the environment's preference is contingent on the environmental impact discount for
the remanufactured product. Finally, the key ﬁndings are distilled into a roadmap to guide the devel-
opment of remanufacturing.
& 2016 Elsevier B.V.. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In recent years, executives around the world are rallying behind
sustainability, and have experienced a dramatic increase of interest in
remanufacturing. Successful examples from many industries show
that remanufacturing can be both faster-growing andmore proﬁtable
than traditional manufacturing (Ayres et al., 1997, Guide and Was-
senhove, 2003, Geyer et al., 2007). However, the remanufacturability
of used products as a whole is restricted by increasing technical
complexity, shorted product life cycle, rising costs and uncertainties.
Remanufacturing at the component level is an alternative that
may help maximize the revenue generated from the return stream
(Fleischmann et al., 2003), which has been a consensus between
researchers and managers. In theory, remanufacturing is deﬁned
as “a production strategy whose goal is to recover the residual
value of used products by reusing components that are still
functioning well” (Debo et al., 2005). In practice, the remanu-
facturing process of Caterpillar (2010) can be brieﬂy described as:
 First, used products collected from customers are disassembled
into their constituent components.
 Next, the individual components are remanufactured to exact
speciﬁcations to ensure they provide the same quality, relia-
bility and durability as they did when they ware new.
 Last, remanufactured components are assembled, tested and
made ready for sale as the remanufactured product.
In addition, nowadays, few manufacturers rely on only them-
selves to design and produce the whole product, which implies
that most components are provided by their suppliers. Thus,
remanufacturing at the component level can be performed by
manufacturers such as Caterpillar, or by their key component
suppliers. In 2008, Chinese National Development and Reform
Commission launched a pilot program of auto part remanu-
facturing, and 14 ﬁrms were selected and supported to start up
remanufacturing, seven of which are auto manufacturers (or their
subsidiaries) and the other seven are part suppliers (Sina, 2008).
Thus, a research question is naturally emerging: what is the
difference between manufacturer-remanufacturing and supplier-
remanufacturing? Our primary objective in this paper is to develop
a general understanding of the desirability of manufacturer-
remanufacturing and supplier-remanufacturing from different sta-
keholder perspectives.
The literature on managing the closed-loop supply chain with
remanufacturing is abundant, we refer the reader to Atasu et al.
(2008a), Guide and Van Wassenhove (2009), and Souza (2013) for a
thorough discussion. It has been demonstrated that remanufacturing
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can be an effective marketing strategy for manufacturers to defend
their market share and render a higher proﬁt (Heese et al., 2005,
Atasu et al., 2008b, Chen and Chang, 2013, Wu, 2015). However, to
the best of our knowledge, few papers consider the possibility of
supplier-remanufacturing and identify the “right” remanufacturer,
especially from the perspectives of the consumers and the environ-
ment. Xiong et al. (2013) make the ﬁrst attempt to analyze how the
interaction between the manufacturer and the supplier on new
product production inﬂuences to the economic and environmental
performance of remanufacturing. We extend Xiong et al. (2013)'s
model to analyze and compare the implications of manufacturer-
remanufacturing and supplier-remanufacturing.
More importantly, our model deviates from the literature by
allowing remanufacturing a used component does not cost less
than manufacturing a new one. On one hand, this deviation is
greatly motivated by the industrial practice: although some pio-
neers have made a proﬁt, most manufacturers have no infra-
structure and expertize to remanufacture in a proﬁtable manner
(Ferguson, 2010). Speciﬁcally, in the globalized world today,
remanufacturing is still largely a local business because many
countries prohibit the international trade of used products. Hua-
wei (2015), the world's third largest cell phone producer, capita-
lizes on recycling in Europe, but does not remanufacture. This may
be driven by the possibility that producing a remanufactured cell
phone in Europe costs more than producing a new one in China.
On the other hand, this derivation leads us to some very inter-
esting ﬁndings on ﬁrms' remanufacturing strategy. The prior lit-
erature on remanufacturing typically defaults that remanufactur-
ing costs less than traditional manufacturing, e.g., in a seminal
research, Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) use the remanufacturing
savings as the key parameter to deﬁne the strategy space. To the
best of our knowledge, only one paper, Caner et al. (2013), con-
siders the situation where remanufacturing is costlier for an
integrated manufacturer. However, it ﬁnds remanufacturing is
seldom proﬁtable in this situation and suggests the manufacturer
focus on situations where remanufacturing costs less. In contrast,
our work demonstrates the manufacturer could be better off by
engaging in remanufacturing even if it costs more than manu-
facturing in a decentralized supply chain. In addition, given
remanufacturing is costlier, the analytical result shows that the
manufacturer may decide to forgo remanufacturing as a result of a
marginal increase in consumer willingness-to-pay for the rema-
nufactured product. These ﬁndings make an excellent complement
to the current literature on remanufacturing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
delineates our modeling assumptions and notation. Section 3
presents the analysis and solutions of two models with
manufacturer-remanufacturing and supplier-remanufacturing,
respectively. Section 4 discusses ﬁrms’ remanufacturing strategy
and identiﬁes the “right” remanufacturer from different stake-
holder perspectives. Section 5 concludes this paper. Appendices
contains the detailed proofs of all propositions. Hereinafter, for
convenience, we use pronouns ‘she’ and ‘he’ to refer to the supplier
and the manufacturer, respectively.
2. Assumptions and notation
We consider an industry with only one product but two ver-
sions: the new product and the remanufactured product. To focus
our attention on the desirability of manufacturer-remanufacturing
and supplier-remanufacturing from different stakeholder per-
spectives, we consider a simple bilateral monopoly, as depicted in
Figs. 1 and 2. In this paper, we do not consider the reverse channel
choice, which has been widely studied in the existing literature,
e.g., Xiong et al. (2014), Hong et al. (2015), and Wei et al. (2015).
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that used products are col-
lected (by the retailer, or the manufacturer, or the third-party
operator) at a constant cost, which is normalized to 0.
To isolate the strategic issue of remanufacturing, our model
rules out the distortion due to efﬁciency variance by assuming that
either the manufacturer or the supplier costs cr to remanufacture a
used component. Similar assumptions have been widely used in
the literature, e.g., Savaskan et al. (2004) assume a manufacturer
and a retailer incur a same cost to collect used products, and
demonstrate the retailer-managed collection is always preferred
by the manufacturer; Zhou et al. (2013) assume centralization and
decentralization within a manufacturer are equivalent in terms of
the cost structure, and ﬁnd decentralization outperforms cen-
tralization under certain conditions. For the sake of clarity, we
assume that, except for the cost to obtain the new/remanufactured
component, the manufacturer's other operating costs are constant
and normalized to 0.
Other key assumptions concerning consumer preference,
environmental performance, and decision-making rule are bor-
rowed from the literature on closed-loop supply chain manage-
ment, e.g., Galbreth et al. (2013), Xiong et al. (2013), Chang et al.
(2015), and Gu et al. (2015). Here, we present the following set of
assumptions, but skip the detailed discussion on their justiﬁcation.
For convenience, Table 1 summarizes the notation used in the
model.
Assumption 1. The inverse demand functions for new and
remanufactured products are
pn ¼ 1qnδqr ; ð1Þ
pr ¼ δ 1qnqr
 
: ð2Þ
Assumption 1 implies that the consumer willingness-to-pay for
the new product is heterogeneous and distributed over the inter-
val 0;1½  with the density of 1; each consumer's willingness-to-pay
for the remanufactured product is a fraction δA 0;1ð Þ of that for
the new one; and each customer buys at most one product that
offers the most utility, as long as the net utility is positive. Thus,
Supplier
Manufacturer
Customers
New 
components
New 
products
Remanufactured 
products
Used products
Forward Flow
Reverse Flow
Fig. 1. The closed-loop supply chain model with manufacturer-remanufacturing.
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products
Used products
Remanufactured 
components
Fig. 2. The closed-loop supply chain model with supplier-remanufacturing.
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the linear inverse demand functions, (Eqs. (1) and 2), can be
derived from consumers’ utility functions.
Assumption 2. The weighted production quantity of new pro-
ducts and remanufactured products qnþϕqr is used as a proxy of
the closed-loop supply chain's environmental performance.
It is broadly agreed that the process of remanufacturing has less
negative impact on the environmental. Assumption 2 implies that
the life-cycle environmental impact of one unit remanufactured
product is a fraction ϕA 0;1ð Þ of that of one unit new product.
Therefore, the closed-loop supply chain’ environmental perfor-
mance is equal to one unit new product's life-cycle environmental
impact multiplied by the weighted production quantity of new
products and remanufactured products. Regardless of the value of
environmental impact, qnþϕqr can be a proxy.
Assumption 3. All decisions are considered in a steady-state
period: the supplier moves ﬁrst to price the new component
(and the remanufactured component), and then the manufacturer
responds by determining the production quantity of new and
remanufactured products.
Closed-loop supply chain management is a typical multiple-
period problem because new products are used for a certain per-
iod and then become cores for remanufacturing. The steady-state
period model implies that players use the same policy in every
period after the ramp-up in the ﬁrst period in an inﬁnite horizon
setting. It enables us to analytically address our research question
without the distraction of initial and terminal time-period effect.
Thus, in our model, by assuming that each product can be used for
one period and remanufactured at most once, the production
quantity of remanufactured products in the current period is
bounded by the production quantity of new products in the pre-
vious period, which is equal to the production quantity of new
products in the current period, i.e., qrrqn. Admittedly, not all used
products could be collected; in practice, we have qrrτqn, τA 0;1½ .
However, assuming τ¼ 1 in this paper does not change any of
qualitative insights.
In addition, we assume that the manufacturer and the supplier
are risk-neutral and proﬁt seeking, and have perfect knowledge of
the demand and cost information – a reasonable assumption in
the steady-state period model. In order to guarantee the market
demand of new and remanufactured products is non-negative, our
model requires cnr1 and crrδ.
In the following analysis, we call the ﬁrm who performs
remanufacturing as the remanufacturer; subscript iA M; Sf g refers
to the manufacturer and the supplier, respectively; superscript jA
M; Sf g manufacturer-remanufacturing and supplier-remanufactur-
ing, respectively. The ﬁrms’ strategic decisions are analyzed under
various scenarios, which are distinguished by parameters cn, cr ,
and δ. Subscript kA 1;2;3f g indicates the scenario under which our
analysis is proceeding.
3. Models and solutions
3.1. The model of manufacturer-remanufacturing
In this subsection, we analyze the model of manufacturer-
remanufacturing, in which the suppliers supplies only the new
component to the manufacturer. The supplier's and the manu-
facturer's proﬁt functions can be written as
ΠMS ¼ wncnð Þqn; ð3Þ
ΠMM ¼ pn qn; qr
 wn
 
qnþ pr qn; qr
 cr
 
qr ; s:t:;0rqrrqn: ð4Þ
The interaction between the supplier and the manufacturer can
be analyzed using backward induction. For a given wn, the man-
ufacturer determines qn and qr to maximize his proﬁt. The optimal
production quantity decisions are characterized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. In the model of manufacturer-remanufacturing,
the manufacturer's optimal production quantity decision with
respect to the supplier's new component wholesale price is
(1) qMn1 ¼ 1wnð Þ=2, qMr1 ¼ 0, if wnocr=δ;
(2) qMn2 ¼ 1wnδþcr
 
=2 1δ , qMr2 ¼ δwncr
 
=2δ 1δ , if
cr=δrwnr crþδcrþδδ2
 
=2δ;
(3) qMn3 ¼ qMr3 ¼ 1wnþδcr
 
=2 1þ3δ , if wn4 crþδcrþδδ2
 
=2δ.
Next, when setting wn, the supplier does so with anticipation
that the manufacturer will respond as above. Since the manu-
facturer's optimal response is contingent on the value of wn, the
process to derive the supplier's optimal new component wholesale
price consists of two steps: (1) we analyze the scenario in which
the supplier induces the manufacturer to choose a certain deci-
sion; and then (2) we identify the optimal solution by comparing
the supplier's proﬁt in all scenarios. For parsimony we restrict our
following analysis to the case of δr2=3. The optimal new com-
ponent wholesale price for the case of δ42=3 is available in the
Proof of Proposition 2, which is a simpliﬁcation of that for the case
of δr2=3.
Proposition 2. In the model of manufacturer-remanufacturing,
the supplier's optimal new component wholesale price is
(1) wMn1 ¼ 1þcnð Þ=2, if cr4cM1 ;
(2) wMn21 ¼ cr=δ, if cM2 ocrrcM1 ;
(3) wMn22 ¼ 1þcnδþcr
 
=2, if cM3 ocrrc
M
2 ;
(4) wMn3 ¼ 1þcnþδcr
 
=2, if crrc
M
3 ; here, c
M
1 ¼ δ 1þcnð Þ=2,
cM2 ¼ δ 1þcnδ
 
= 2δ ,
cM3 ¼ cnþδcnþ2δ
21δþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Α
p 
=2δ,
Α¼ 12cnþcn2þ2δ4δcnþ2δcn2þ3δ2þ6δ2cn3δ2cn2.
It is worth noting that, the supplier has taken the manu-
facturer's optimal response into account when setting wn. So, if the
supplier's optimal decision is wMnk, then the manufacturer's optimal
decision must be qMnk; q
M
rk
 
. Substituting these optimal decisions
back into Eqs. (3) and (4) gives the supplier's and the manu-
facturer's proﬁts, as shown in Table 2.
3.2. The model of supplier-remanufacturing
In the model of supplier-remanufacturing, the supplier supplies
both the new and the remanufactured components to the manu-
facturer. Their proﬁt functions are
ΠSS ¼ wncnð Þqnþ wrcrð Þqr ; ð5Þ
Table 1
Notation.
Symbol Deﬁnition
cn , cr The unit production cost of the new/remanufactured component
qn , qr The production quantity of the new/remanufactured product
pn , pr The market clearing price of the new/remanufactured product
wn , wr The wholesale price of the new/remanufactured component
δ The consumer value discount for the remanufactured product
ϕ The environmental impact discount for the remanufactured product
Π
j
ik
The player i’s proﬁt in scenario k of the model of j
υ
j
k
The consumer surplus in scenario k of the model of j
Ε
j
k
The supply chain's environmental performance in scenario k of the
model of j
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ΠSM ¼ pn qn; qr
 wn
 
qnþ pr qn; qr
 wr
 
qr ; s:t:;0rqrrqn: ð6Þ
Following from Eqs. (4) and (6), we have, replacing cr in the
manufacturer's proﬁt function in the model of manufacturer-
remanufacturing with wr gives his proﬁt function in the model
of supplier-remanufacturing. Thus, intuitively, replacing cr in
Proposition 1 with wr gives the manufacturer's optimal production
quantity decision in the model of supplier-remanufacturing.
Similarly, we identify the supplier's optimal decision in two
steps, as follows.
Proposition 3. . In the model of supplier-remanufacturing, the
supplier's optimal wholesale prices for new and remanufactured
components are
(1) wSn1 ¼ 1þcnð Þ=2,.wSr1 ¼ δ 1þcnð Þ=2., if cr4cS1;
(2) wSn2 ¼ 1þcnð Þ=2, wSr2 ¼ δþcr
 
=2, if cS2rcrrc
S
1;
(3) wSn3 ¼ 1þ4δδ
2þ 1þδ  cnþcrð Þ
 
=2 1þ3δ ,
wSr3 ¼ δ 2δþcnþcr
 
= 1þ3δ , if crocS2; here, cS1 ¼ δcn, cS2 ¼
δ 2cnþδ1
 
= 1þδ .
Substituting these optimal decisions back into Eqs. (5) and (6)
gives the supplier's and the manufacturer's proﬁts, as shown in
Table 3.
4. Comparison and discussion
4.1. Whether to remanufacture
In this subsection, we examine the decision on whether to
remanufacturing. Substituting the optimal wholesale price(s) in
Propositions 2 and 3 back into the manufacturer's optimal
response function gives the production quantity of new and
remanufactured products. We say the remanufacturer decides to
engage in remanufacturing if qr40. It is easy to get the following
Corollaries:
Corollary 1. In the model of manufacturer-remanufacturing, there
exists a threshold value cM2 such that the manufacturer should
engage in remanufacturing if crrc
M
2 ; the threshold value c
M
2 4cn if
cnoδ=2.
Corollary 2. In the model of supplier-remanufacturing, there
exists a threshold value cS1 such that the supplier should engage in
remanufacturing if croc
S
1; the threshold value c
S
1ocn.
Corollaries 1 and 2 show that in both models, the impact of the
remanufacturing cost cr on the decision of whether to remanufacture
is monotone, i.e., the lower the value of cr is, the more likely the
remanufacturer is to engage in remanufacturing. What is more
interesting and important, we ﬁnd that the manufacturer may
engage in remanufacturing even if remanufacturing a used compo-
nent costs more than manufacturing a new one. The economic
intuition behind this ﬁnding is explained as follows. The supplier
measures the cost savings from remanufacturing by comparing cr
and cn, thus, she may remanufacture used components only if
crocn. By contrast, the manufacturer measures the cost savings by
comparing cr and wn. A proﬁt seeking supplier must set wnZcn.
Thus, it may be proﬁtable for the manufacturer to remanufacture
used components if cnocrown.
Next, we can rewrite Propositions 2 and 3 using the consumer
value discount for the remanufactured product δ as the separating
parameter. Thus, following from Corollaries 1 and 2, and letting
cr ¼ cM2 (cr ¼ cS1), we have δ¼ 1þcnþcr7
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Β
p 
=2 (δ¼ cr=cn), Β¼
1þ2cnþ2cncrþcn26crþcr2. The impact of δ on the decision of
whether to remanufacture is followed.
Corollary 3. In the model of manufacturer-remanufacturing, there
exists two threshold values δ
M
1 ¼ 1þcnþcr
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Β
p 
=2 and δ
M
2 ¼
1þcnþcrþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Β
p 
=2 such that the manufacturer should engage in
remanufacturing if δM1 oδoδ
M
2 ; the threshold value δ
M
2 o1 if
cr4cn.
Corollary 4. In the model of supplier-remanufacturing, there
exists a threshold value δ
S
1 ¼ cr=cn such that the supplier should
engage in remanufacturing if δ4δS1; the threshold value δ
S
141
if cr4cn.
Corollaries 3 and 4 show that in both models, the impact of δ
on the decision of whether to remanufacture is monotone if
crrcn, i.e., the higher the value of δ is, the more likely the
remanufacturer is to engage in remanufacturing. But, if cr4cn,
although the supplier should not remanufacture any used com-
ponent, the impact of δ on the manufacturer's decision of rema-
nufacturing is non-monotone, i.e., as the value of δ increases, at
ﬁrst, the manufacturer is more likely to engage in remanufactur-
ing, but eventually, the manufacturer is more likely to forgo
remanufacturing.
This ﬁnding is striking because it challenges the generally
accepted notion that consumers' low willingness-to-pay for the
remanufactured product is a major barrier for remanufacturing (Liu
et al., 2009, Atasu et al., 2010, Abbey et al., 2015). In order to
understand the counterintuitive ﬁnding, let's revisit the interaction
between the supplier and the manufacturer in the model of
manufacturer-remanufacturing where remanufacturing is proﬁtable
if the consumer value discount for the remanufactured product is
not low enough and the remanufactured component will canniba-
lize the supplier's new component sales. If the value of δ is mod-
erate, the potential cannibalization problem is not serious, and then
the supplier is better off by accommodating remanufacturing, e.g.,
pricing the new component at wM22 ¼ 1þcmδþcr
 
=2; however,
if the value of δ is high, and then the supplier is better off by
changing her strategy to successfully thwart remanufacturing, e.g.,
pricing the new component at wM21 ¼ cr=δ. As a result, taking the
supplier's strategic behavior into account, the manufacturer's deci-
sion on whether to remanufacture may switch from engaging in to
forgoing as the increasing of δ.
4.2. Who is the “right” remanufacturer?
In this subsection, we identify the “right” remanufacturer from
different stakeholder perspectives. Following from Propositions
2 and 3, we have six scenarios to examine the desirability of
manufacturer-remanufacturing and supplier-remanufacturing, as
shown in Table 4 and illustrated in Fig. 3. Here, we list only the
Table 2
The proﬁt expressions in the model of manufacturer-remanufacturing.
crrc
M
3 c
M
3 ocrrc
M
2 c
M
2 ocrrc
M
1 cr4c
M
1
ΠMS
1 cn  cr þ δð Þ2
8 1þ3δð Þ
1 cn þ cr  δð Þ2
8 1 δð Þ
δ crð Þ cr  δcnð Þ
2δ2
1 cnð Þ2
8
ΠMM
1 cn  cr þ δð Þ2
16 1þ3δð Þ
X
16δ 1δð Þ δ crð Þ
2
4δ2
1 cnð Þ2
16
X ¼ δcn22δ 1þcrδð Þcnþ 43δð Þcr26δ 1δð Þcrþδþ2δ23δ3 .
Table 3
The proﬁt expressions in the model of supplier-remanufacturing.
croc
S
2 c
S
2rcrrc
S
1 cr4c
S
1
ΠSS
1 cn  cr þδð Þ2
8 1þ3δð Þ
Y
8δ 1δð Þ 1 cnð Þ
2
8
ΠSM
1 cn  cr þδð Þ2
16 1þ3δð Þ
Y
16δ 1δð Þ 1 cnð Þ
2
16
Y ¼ δcn22δ 1þcrδð Þcnþcr2þδδ2 .
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supplier's optimal decision in each scenario. As said before, if the
supplier's optimal decision is wMnk or w
S
nk;w
S
rk
 
, then the manu-
facturer's optimal response must be qink; q
i
rk
 
. It is worth noting
that, the solid line in Fig. 3 refers to cr ¼ cM3 , which separates the
manufacturer's, the consumers’ and the environment's pre-
ferences to manufacturer-remanufacturing and supplier-remanu-
facturing, as demonstrated by the following Propositions.
In line with intuition, if the remanufacturing cost is sufﬁciently
low croc
S
2 or sufﬁciently high cr4c
M
1 , all used products or no used
product will be remanufactured in both models, and then
manufacturer-remanufacturing and supplier-remanufacturing are
equivalent from the perspective of all stakeholders (as shown in
Proofs of Propositions 4–7). Thus, in what follows, we focus on the
scenarios under the condition cS2rcrrc
M
1 , i.e., Scenarios 2–5.
From the perspective of the manufacturer, we identify the
“right” remanufacturer as the ﬁrm who makes the manufacturer
obtain a higher proﬁt. Thus, by comparing the manufacturer's
proﬁts in models of manufacturer-remanufacturing and supplier-
remanufacturing, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. From the perspective of the manufacturer,
manufacturer-remanufacturing is preferred if cr4c
M
3 ; otherwise,
supplier-remanufacturing is preferred.
Following from Eqs. (4) and (6), letting the supplier remanufacture,
the manufacturer's cost to obtain a unit remanufactured component
will change from cr to wr; in addition, a proﬁt seeking supplier must
price wr higher than cr . Well, why does the manufacturer still beneﬁt
from supplier-remanufacturing if the remanufacturing cost is low
enough? The economic intuition behind Proposition 4 lies in that, if
crrc
M
3 , remanufacturing is so proﬁtable that the manufacturer is
willing to remanufacture all used products, and then new and rema-
nufactured products exhibit the characteristics of complements (Debo
et al., 2005, Xiong et al., 2013). Therefore, the supplier can appropriate
the remanufacturing beneﬁt by pricing the new component higher,
which leads to a smaller optimal production quantity of new and
remanufactured products and consequently, makes manufacturer-
remanufacturing less attractive for the manufacturer. By contrast,
with supplier-remanufacturing, although the cost to obtain a unit
remanufactured component is higher, the manufacturer can obtain a
lower wholesale price for the new component, e.g., wMn34w
S
n2. So
supplier-remanufacturing is more desirable for the manufacturer if the
remanufacturing cost is low enough.
Similarly, from the perspective of the supplier, the “right”
remanufacturer is identiﬁed as follows.
Proposition 5. From the perspective of the supplier, supplier-
remanufacturing is always preferred over manufacturer-
remanufacturing.
Proposition 5 shows that manufacturer-remanufacturing is
always detrimental to the supplier. The economic intuition behind
this result is straightforward. On one hand, if cr4c
M
3 , the remanu-
factured component is a substitute for the new component, then
manufacture-remanufacturing will cannibalize the sales of the new
component and hurt the supplier. On the other hand, if crrc
M
3 ,
with manufacturer-remanufacturing, the proﬁt seeking supplier
will strategically price the new component higher and the proﬁt
seeking manufacturer will strategically produce fewer new pro-
ducts, which forms a loss–loss situation. As a result, manufacturer-
remanufacturing is never preferred by the supplier.
From the perspective of the consumers, we identify the “right”
remanufacturer as the ﬁrmwho makes consumers obtain a greater
surplus. Based on our linear inverse demand functions, consumer's
surplus is calculated as
υj
k
¼ 1
2
1pj
nk
 
qj
nk
þ1
2
δpj
rk
 
qj
rk
ð7Þ
Comparing the consumers' surpluses in models of
manufacturer-remanufacturing and supplier-remanufacturing
gives the following proposition.
Proposition 6. From the perspective of the consumers,
manufacturer-remanufacturing is preferred if cr4c
M
3 ; otherwise,
supplier-remanufacturing is preferred.
Following from Propositions 4 and 6, it is revealed that con-
sumers have the same preference as the manufacturer. This is
because, on one hand, if cr4c
M
3 , the manufacturer will engage in
remanufacturing, but the supplier will not, and then remanu-
facturing drives down the new product price and provides a low-
price alternative to the consumers who cannot afford the new
product, so manufacturer-remanufacturing is more preferable; on
the other hand, if crrc
M
3 , as said before, manufacturer-
remanufacturing results in a higher new product price and con-
sequently a lower production quantity, which reduce the con-
sumers’ surplus, and then supplier-remanufacturing is naturally
more preferable.
It is worth noting that, we use the weighted production
quantity qnþϕqr as a proxy of the closed-loop supply chain's
environmental performance. From the perspective of the envir-
onment, the “right” remanufacturer is identiﬁed as the ﬁrm whose
remanufacturing business leads to less impact on the environ-
ment, i.e., a fewer weighted production quantity qnþϕqr .
Proposition 7. From the perspective of the environment, if
cr4c
M
3 , supplier-remanufacturing is preferred regardless of the
value of ϕ; if crrcM3 , supplier-remanufacturing is preferred if ϕ is
Table 4
These six scenarios of comparison.
Scenario Condition wMn w
S
n;w
S
r
 
1 cr4c
M
1 w
M
n1 w
S
n1;w
S
r1
 
2 cM2 ocrrc
M
1 w
M
21 w
S
n1;w
S
r1
 
3 cM3 ocrrc
M
2 w
M
22 w
S
n1;w
S
r1
 
4 cS1ocrrc
M
3 w
M
n3 w
S
n1;w
S
r1
 
5 cS2rcrrc
S
1 w
M
n3 w
S
n2;w
S
r2
 
6 croc
S
2 w
M
n3 w
S
n3;w
S
r3
 
Scenario 1
Scenario 6
Fig. 3. The illustration of these six scenarios.
Y. Xiong et al. / Int. J. Production Economics 176 (2016) 21–28 25
large enough, otherwise, manufacturer-remanufacturing is
preferred.
It is worth noting that, if cr4c
M
3 , the proﬁt seeking supplier does
not remanufacture used products. However, Proposition 7 reveals
that supplier-remanufacturing is then preferred from the perspective
of the environment. The economic intuition has been discussed by
Xiong et al. (2013). Even with ϕ¼ 0, although remanufacturing
cannibalizes the sales of the new product, the proﬁt seeking supplier
will strategically lower the new component price, e.g., wM22ow
S
n1,
making the manufacturer better off by producing more new pro-
ducts, so remanufacturing is then detrimental to the environment.
On the other hand, if crrc
M
3 , in the model of manufacturer-rema-
nufacturing, fewer new products will be produced; however, all used
products will be remanufactured. Therefore, manufacturer-
remanufacturing leads to fewer new products but more remanu-
factured products compared with supplier-remanufacturing. Intui-
tively, the desirability of manufacturer-remanufacturing and
supplier-remanufacturing depends on the value of ϕ.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, motivated by the pilot program of auto part
remanufacturing in China, we analyze the performance of
manufacturer-remanufacturing and supplier-remanufacturing,
and examine their desirability from different stakeholder per-
spectives. Most of our modeling elements are widely used in the
literature, but a main deviation lies in the unit remanufacturing
cost is allowed to be higher than the unit manufacturing cost,
which is motivated by the fact that not all manufacturers and
suppliers have the infrastructure and expertize to remanufacture
cost-efﬁciently.
Our analytical result conﬁrms that both the manufacturer and
the supplier are more likely to engage in remanufacturing as the
decreasing of the unit remanufacturing cost. However, a less-
intuitive ﬁnding is that the manufacturer (and only the manu-
facturer) may engage in remanufacturing even if remanufacturing
a used component is costlier than manufacturing a new one. This
ﬁnding implies that manufacturers could start up remanufacturing
even if its technology is not sophisticated, which is consistent with
our observation of the development of remanufacturing in many
industries where high-proﬁle manufacturers like Boeing, Cater-
pillar, General Electric, IBM, Kodak, Volkswagen and Xerox initiate
a business model in which remanufacturing is an integral part.
We also ﬁnd that if remanufacturing costs less, both the man-
ufacturer and the supplier are more likely to engage in remanu-
facturing as a marginal increase in consumer willingness-to-pay
for the remanufactured product; in contrast, if remanufacturing
costs more, the manufacturer may forgo remanufacturing due to a
marginal increase in consumer willingness-to-pay for the rema-
nufactured product. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that supplier-
remanufacturing is a dominant strategy for both the manufacturer
and the supplier if the remanufacturing cost is low enough.
These ﬁndings delineate a clear trajectory to guide the devel-
opment of remanufacturing from a business perspective. At the
early stage when the remanufacturing technology is unsophisti-
cated, i.e., remanufacturing has a cost disadvantage, manufacturers
should pioneer, and then the direction to promote remanufactur-
ing is to invest in process innovation and lower the remanu-
facturing cost. As the remanufacturing technology becomes more
sophisticated, i.e., remanufacturing enjoys a cost advantage, sup-
pliers should be encouraged to engage in remanufacturing, and
then tactics such as consumer education could be adopted to
increase consumer willingness-to-pay for the remanufactured
product and accelerate the development of remanufacturing.
This paper also examines the desirability of manufacturer-
remanufacturing and supplier-remanufacturing from the per-
spective of the consumers and the environment, which may guide
consumer groups and environmental organizations to lobby. As
Xiong et al. (2013) commented, a simple governmental policy to
spur more remanufacturing activities may be detrimental to both
the industry and the environment. Given the tensions between
different stakeholder perspectives, the government has to make a
tradeoff and deliberate on the policy to take the full advantage of
remanufacturing for a sustainable future.
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Appendices
Proof of Proposition 1
In the model of manufacturer-remanufacturing, the Lagrangean
and the KKT optimality conditions for the manufacturer's optimi-
zation problem are
L¼ pn qMn ; qMr
 wn
 
qMn þ pr qMn ; qMr
 cr
 
qMr þλ1qMr λ2 qMr qMn
 
;
ðA1Þ
∂L=∂qMn ¼ 12qMn 2δqMr wnþλ2 ¼ 0; ðA2Þ
∂L=∂qMr ¼ δ qMn þqMr
 þδ 1qMn qMr
 crþλ1λ2 ¼ 0; ðA3Þ
λ1q
M
r ¼ λ2 qMr qMn
 ¼ 0; ðA4Þ
qMn Zq
M
r Z0: ðA5Þ
Because the multipliers λ1 and λ2 can be either zero or positive,
we have four scenarios to examine.
Scenario 1 with λ140 and λ2 ¼ 0: we have qMr1 ¼ 0 according to
the optimality condition (A4); substituting λ2 ¼ 0 and qMr1 ¼ 0 back
into Eqs. (A2) and (A3) gives qMn1 ¼ 1wnð Þ=2 and λ1 ¼ crδwn;
here, λ140 requires wnocr=δ.
Scenario 2 with λ1 ¼ 0 and λ2 ¼ 0: by solving simultaneous Eqs.
(A2) and (A3), we have qMn2 ¼ 1wnδþcr
 
=2 1δ  and
qMr2 ¼ δwncr
 
=2δ 1δ ; the optimality condition (A5) requires
cr=δrwnr crþδcrþδδ2
 
=2δ.
Scenario 3 with λ1 ¼ 0 and λ240: similar to Scenario 1, we
have qMn3 ¼ qMr3 ¼ 1wnþδcr
 
=2 1þ3δ  and λ2 ¼ 2δwnþδ2

δcrδcrÞ= 1þ3δ
 
, which requires wn4 crþδcrþδδ2
 
=2δ.
Scenario 4 with λ140 and λ240: according to the optimality
condition (A4), we have qMn4 ¼ qMr4 ¼ 0, which is trivial and
discarded.
Proof of Proposition 2
Scenario M1. We assume that in this scenario the supplier
behaves to let the manufacturer chooses qMn1; q
M
r1
 
. Thus, her
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optimization problem is
max
wMn
ΠMS1 ¼ wMn cn
 
qMn1; ðA6Þ
subject to wMn ocr=δ, which guarantees that the manufacturer will
respond by choosing qMn1; q
M
r1
 
, see Proposition 1. It is easy to get
the unconstrained optimal solution wMn1 ¼ 1þcnð Þ=2, which is the
optimal wholesale price if cr4δ 1þcnð Þ=2 according to the con-
straint wMn ocr=δ. If crrδ 1þcnð Þ=2, then the optimal wholesale
price in this case is inﬁnitely closed to cr=δ, which is dominated by
wM21 ¼ cr=δ (we get this solution in the next case).
Scenario M2. In this scenario, we assume that the supplier
behaves to let the manufacturer chooses qMn2; q
M
r2
 
. The optimi-
zation problem is
max
wMn
ΠMS2 ¼ wMn cn
 
qMn2; ðA7Þ
subject to cr=δrwMn r crþδcrþδδ2
 
=2δ. Similar to the proof
of Proposition 1, we have the optimal wholesale price
(1) wMn21 ¼ cr=δ, if cr4δ 1þcnδ
 
= 2δ ;
(2) wMn22 ¼ 1þcnδþcr
 
=2, if δcnrcrrδ 1þcnδ
 
= 2δ ;
(3) wMn23 ¼ crþδcrþδδ
2
 
=2δ, if croδcn.
Scenario M3. In this scenario, we assume that the supplier
behaves to let the manufacturer chooses qMn3; q
M
r3
 
. The optimi-
zation problem is
max
wMn
ΠMS3 ¼ wMn cn
 
qMn3; ðA8Þ
subject to wMn 4 crþδcrþδδ2
 
=2δ, and then similar to Case M1,
the optimal wholesale price is wMn3 ¼ 1þδþcncr
 
=2 if
croδ cnþ2δ
 
= 1þ2δ .
Next, we are to identify the optimal wholesale price on the
whole parameter space. With δZ1=2, it is easy to prove that
δ cnþ2δ
 
= 1þ2δ Zδ 1þcnð Þ=24δ 1þcnδ
 
= 2δ 4δcn.
Thus, if cr4δ 1þcnð Þ=2, the supplier has two possible solutions: (1)
wMn1 and letting the manufacturer chooses q
M
n1; q
M
r1
 
, and (2) wMn21
and letting the manufacturer chooses qMn2; q
M
r2
 
. Solving for
ΠMS1 w
M
n1; q
M
n1; q
M
r1
 
4ΠMS2 w
M
n21; q
M
n2; q
M
r2
 
, we get cr4δ 1þcnð Þ=2.
Thus, in this situation, the wholesale price wMn1 is a dominant
strategy for the supplier. Similarly, it can be demonstrated that
from the perspective of the supplier, wMn1 is preferred over w
M
n3 if
δ 1þcnð Þ=2ocroδ cnþ2δ
 
= 1þ2δ ; wMn21 is preferred over wMn3
if δ 1þcnδ
 
= 2δ ocrrδ 1þcnð Þ=2; wMn3 is preferred over
wMn23 if croδcn.
If δcnocrrδ 1þcnδ
 
= 2δ , two possible solutions are: (1)
wMn22 and letting the manufacturer chooses q
M
n2; q
M
r2
 
, and (2) wMn3
and letting the manufacturer chooses qMn3; q
M
r3
 
. Let Δ
M ¼
ΠMS2 w
M
n22; q
M
n2; q
M
r2
 ΠMS3 wMn3; qMn3; qMr3
 
, we have ∂Δ
M
=∂cr40,
Δ
M
cr ¼ δcn
 ¼  δ 1cnð Þ
 2
=2 1þ3δ o0, and ΔM cr ¼ð δ 1þð
cnδÞ= 2δ
 Þ ¼ 23δ δ 1cnð Þ2=2 1þ3δ
 
2δ 2. In this sce-
nario, if δZ2=3, Δ
M
cr ¼ δ 1þcnδ
 
= 2δ  r0, thus wMn3 is
always preferred over wMn22; if 1=2rδo2=3, Δ
M
cr ¼ δ 1þð

cnδÞ= 2δ
 Þ40, and then there exists cM3 (its expression can be
found in Proposition 2) such that wMn3 is preferred if δcnocroc
M
3 ,
otherwise, wMn22 is preferred.
The Scenario with δo1=2 is a simpliﬁcation of that with
1=2rδo2=3. With 1=3rδo1=2, we can skip the comparison of
wMn1 and w
M
n3, and with δo1=3, we can further skip the comparison
of wMn21 and w
M
n3. The results are all the same in the Scenario with
1=2rδo2=3.
Combining the above analysis and comparison gives the sup-
plier's optimal wholesale price of the new component in the
model of manufacturer-remanufacturing.
Proof of Proposition 3
Scenario S1. In this scenario, we assume that the supplier
behaves to let the manufacturer chooses qSn1; q
S
r1
 
. The optimi-
zation problem is
max
wSn ;w
S
r
ΠSS1 ¼ wSncn
 
qSn1þ wSr cr
 
qSr1; ðA9Þ
subject to wSnow
S
r=δ. It is easy to get that the unconstrained
solution is wSn1 ¼ 1þcnð Þ=2, which is the optimal wholesale price of
the new component if wSr14δw
S
n1. Because Π
S
S1 is independent in
wSr , we do not care about the exact value of w
S
r1. As we will get in
the next case, with wSn21;w
S
r21
 
, we have qSr2 ¼ qSr1 ¼ 0. Thus,
the solutions, wSn1;w
S
r1
 
and wSn21;w
S
r21
 
, are equivalent.
Scenario S2. In this scenario, we assume that the supplier
behaves to let the manufacturer chooses qSn2; q
S
r2
 
. The optimi-
zation problem is
max
wSn ;w
S
r
ΠSS2 ¼ wSncn
 
qSn2þ wSr cr
 
qSr2; ðA10Þ
subject to wSr=δrw
S
nr w
S
r þδwSr þδδ2
 
=2δ. Similar to the Proof
of Proposition 1, we have the optimal wholesale prices of new and
remanufactured components
(1) wSn21 ¼ 1þcnð Þ=2, wSr21 ¼ δ 1þcnð Þ=2, if cr4δcn;
(2) wSn22 ¼ 1þcnð Þ=2, wSr22 ¼ δþcr
 
=2, if δ 2cnþδ1
 
=
1þδ rcrrδcn;
(3) wSn23 ¼ 1þ4δδ
2þ 1þδ  cnþcrð Þ
 
=2 1þ3δ ,
wSr23 ¼ δ 2δþcnþcr
 
= 1þ3δ , if croδ 2cnþδ1
 
= 1þδ .
Scenario S3. In this scenario, we assume that the supplier
behaves to let the manufacturer chooses qSn3; q
S
r3
 
. The optimi-
zation problem is
max
wSn ;w
S
r
ΠSS3 ¼ wSncn
 
qSn3þ wSr cr
 
qSr3; ðA11Þ
subject to wSn4 w
S
r þδwSr þδδ2
 
=2δ. Because of qSn3 ¼ qSr3, the
optimization problem can be rewritten as
max
wSn ;w
S
r
ΠSS3 ¼ wSnþwSr cncr
 
qSn3: ðA12Þ
Clearly, ΠSS3 is concave in the sum of w
S
n and w
S
r . We have the
unconstrained solutions satisfy wSn3þwSr3 ¼ 1þδþcnþcr
 
=2.
Without loss of generality, we set wSr3 ¼wSr23, the unconstrained
relationship wSn3þwSr3 ¼ 1þδþcnþcr
 
=2 requires wSn3 ¼wSn23,
and the constraint wSn4 w
S
r þδwSr þδδ2
 
=2δ requires wSn3 is
inﬁnitely closed to wSn23. Thus, we say that the solutions,
wSn3;w
S
r3
 
and wSn23;w
S
r23
 
, are equivalent.
Combining the above analysis and comparison gives the sup-
plier's optimal wholesale prices of new and remanufactured
components in the model of supplier-remanufacturing.
Proof of Proposition 4
Clearly, we have six scenarios to compare the manufacturer's
proﬁts. We deﬁne ΔMl ¼ΠMMΠSM in scenario l.
In Scenario 1 with cr4c
M
1 , ΔM1 ¼ 0.
In Scenario 2 with cM2 ocrrc
M
1 , ∂
2ΔM2=∂cr
2 ¼ 1=2δ240, letting
∂ΔM2=∂cr ¼ 0, we have cr ¼ δ, that is to say, ΔM2 reaches its global
minimum at cr ¼ δ. In addition, the condition of this scenario
implies cM2 oc
M
1 oδ. Thus, we have ΔM2ZΔM2 cr ¼ cM1
 ¼ 0.
In Scenario 3 with cM3 ocrrc
M
2 , similar to Scenario 2, we have
ΔM340.
In Scenario 4 with cS1ocrrc
M
3 , ∂
2ΔM4=∂cr
2 ¼ 1=8 1þ3δ 40, in
addition, the condition of this scenario implies cS1oc
M
3 oc
M
2 . We have
ΔM4 cr ¼ cM2
 ¼ δ 1δ  83δ  1cnð Þ2=16 1þ3δ
 
2δ 2o0,
and ΔM4 cr ¼ cS1
 ¼ δ 1δ  1cnð Þ2=16 1þ3δ
 
o0. Thus,
ΔM4o0.
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In Scenario 5 with cS2rcrrc
S
1, ΔM5 ¼  δþcrþδcr2δcn

δ2Þ2=16δ 1þ3δ  1δ r0.
In Scenario 6 with croc
S
2, ΔM6 ¼ 0.
Combining these results in all six scenarios gives Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5
Similarly, we deﬁne ΔSl ¼ΠMS ΠSS in scenario l.
In Scenario 1 with cr4c
M
1 , ΔS1 ¼ 0.
In Scenario 2 with cM2 ocrrc
M
1 , ΔS2 ¼  δþδcn2cr
 2
=8δo0.
In Scenario 3 with cM3 ocrrc
M
2 , ∂
2ΔS3=∂cr
2 ¼ 1=8 1δ 40,
letting ∂ΔS3=∂cr ¼ 0, we have cr ¼ δþcn1, that is to say, ΔS3
reaches its global minimum at cr ¼ δþcn1. In addition, the
condition of this scenario implies δþcn1ocM3 ocM2 . Thus, ΔS3 is
increasing in cr . We have ΔS3rΔS3 cr ¼ cM2
 ¼  1cnð Þ2δ2=
8 2δ 2o0.
In Scenario 4 with cS1ocrrc
M
3 , similar to Scenario 3, we have
ΔS4o0.
In Scenario 5 with cS2rcrrc
S
1, ΔS5 ¼  δþcrþδcr2δcn

δ2Þ2=8δ 1þ3δ  1δ o0.
In Scenario 6 with croc
S
2, ΔS6 ¼ 0.
Combining these results in all six scenarios gives Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6
Similarly, we deﬁne Δυl ¼ υMυS in scenario l.
In Scenario 1 with cr4c
M
1 , Δυ1 ¼ 0.
In Scenario 2 with cM2 ocrrc
M
1 , ∂
2Δυ2=∂cr
2 ¼ 1=4δ240, letting
∂Δυ2=∂cr ¼ 0, we have cr ¼ cM1 , that is to say, ΔS3 reaches its global
minimum at cr ¼ cM1 . We have Δυ2ZΔυ2 cr ¼ cM1
 ¼ 0.
In Scenario 3 with cM3 ocrrc
M
2 , ∂
2Δυ3=∂cr
2 ¼  86δ =
32δ 1δ o0, letting ∂Δυ3=∂cr ¼ 0, we have cr ¼ 3þð
cn3δÞδ= 43δ
 
, that is to say, Δυ3 reaches its global maximum at
cr ¼ 3þcn3δ
 
δ= 43δ . In addition, the condition of this sce-
nario implies cS1oc
M
3 oc
M
2 o 3þcn3δ
 
δ= 43δ . Thus, Δυ3 is
increasing in cr . We have Δυ34ΔS3 cr ¼ cS1
 ¼ 3δ 1cnð Þ2=3240.
In Scenario 4 with cS1ocrrc
M
3 , similar to Scenario 3, we have
Δυ4o0.
In Scenario 5 with cS2rcrrc
S
1, Δυ5 ¼  δþcrþδcr

2δcnδ2Þ2=32δ 1þ3δ
 
1δ o0.
In Scenario 6 with croc
S
2, Δυ6 ¼ 0.
Combining these results in all six scenarios gives Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 7
Similarly, we deﬁne ΔΕl ¼ΕMΕS in scenario l.
In Scenario 1 with cr4c
M
1 , ΔΕ1 ¼ 0.
In Scenario 2 with cM2 ocrrc
M
1 , ΔΕ2 ¼ δþδcn2cr
 
=4δ,
clearly, ΔΕ2 is decreasing in cr . Thus, we have
ΔΕ2ZΔΕ2 cr ¼ cM1
 ¼ 0.
In Scenario 3 with cM3 ocrrc
M
2 , ∂ΔΕ3=∂ϕ40. Thus,
ΔΕ3ZΔΕ3 ϕ¼ 0
 ¼ crδcn
 
=4 1δ . In addition, the condition
of this scenario implies cS1oc
M
3 oc
M
2 . Thus, ΔΕ34ΔΕ3 cr ¼ cS1
 ¼ 0.
In Scenario 4 with cS1ocrrc
M
3 , ΔΕ4 ϕ¼ 0; cr ¼ cS1
 ¼ δ 1cnð Þ
=2 1þ3δ o0 and ΔΕ4 ϕ¼ 1; cr ¼ cS1
 ¼ 1δ  1cnð Þ=4 1þð
3δÞ40. Thus, in this scenario, there must exist a threshold value
(letting ΔΕ4 ¼ 0, we have) ϕ¼ϕ0 ¼ 2δþcr3δcn
 
= 1cnþδcr
 
such that if ϕ4ϕ
0
, ΔΕ440; otherwise, ΔΕ4r0.
In Scenario 5 with cS2rcrrc
S
1, similar to Scenario 4, there
exists a threshold value ϕ¼ϕ″¼ 2δ= 1þδ  such that if ϕ4ϕ″,
ΔΕ540; otherwise, ΔΕ5r0.
In Scenario 6 with croc
S
2, ΔΕ6 ¼ 0.
Combining these results in all six scenarios gives Proposition 7.
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